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The events reveal an independent economie and politieal role of the sanctuary, and it would appear that the clash of interests between cult and city was neither confined to a transitional period nor overcome by the city's increasing control of the shrine.
However, Mylasa has yielded not only this fascinating dossier of epigraphie texts but also a large series of inscriptions whieh deal with the purchase and lease of properties by sanctuaries. Although these land-Iease documents differ from the third-century letters in character and content, they have a common theme: "sacred finances and land". Many private landowners transferred sorne or aU of their properties to a sanctuary but, peculiarly, .immediately rented them back from the gods. 2 Apart from the Delian temple accounts, the Carian land-Iease documents represent our largest record of transactions concerning sacred properties. 3 They come not only from the city of Mylasa itself but also from Olymus, Hydae, Sinuri and Labraunda. 4 These four places 'were neighbouring communities and closely related to Mylasa. Towards the end of the third century B.C., they were "absorbed" by sympoliteia and became subdivisions (demoi) of the greater Mylasean state.
5
The texts have generally been dated to the second half of the second or even the beginning of the first century B.C. However, Reger recently suggested that they should be attributed to the beginning of the second or even the end of the third century B.C. His dating depends on his interpretation of Rhodian coinage and the assumption that cities of Caria called the Romans "common benefactors" as early as 188 B.e. 6 Although Roman presence may not be directly visible, the central ruler had definitely changed for Mylasa by the middle of the second century B.e. In a contemporary honorary decreefor a certain Menecrates, the Romans are named as KOWOl eùepyé'tut and this title could have been used from 167 B.e. onwards, when the Romans declared Caria free from Rhodian rule.
7 1 find it problematic to date the leasing-documents twenty years earlier than this. 8 
Characteristics of the Land-leases
Neither the purchase, nor the lease of land by sanctuaries are surprising. Harpocration cites the grammarian Didymus, who explains the term /!îcr8ro/!u as the 'equivalent to "revenues from teméne", and as the means of meeting the expenses of sacrifice. 9 Although it did occur, it was the exception that the renting out of the property of a god was forbidden. lO However, such leases were subject to special laws. An early inscription from Athens gives instructions to the archon basileus) who was in charge of the lease of sacred land, to turn to the law about sacred domainsY Among other parallel evidence is the main Delian law on the lease of sacred property ( crUYYPlX<P~).12 Everywhere in the Greek world, contracts regarding leases of sacred land showed similar characteristics and wording. It is the combination of purchase and immediate hereditary lease to the former owner which singles out the documents from Mylasa.
The land-transfers consisted of several legal transactions, whieh are reflected by the following four types of documents: the decree by whieh a tribe resolved to buy an offered property (",~<ptcrl!lX), the document of purchase (ffivf]ç XPlll!lX'ttcrI!Oç), the document recording the taking over of the property by the commissioners (Ë1!~lXcrtÇ), and the contract fixing the hereditary lease (l!tcrElfficreroç XPlll!lX'ttcrI!Oç). The initial decree itself comprised the following proceedings: the commissioners reported to the assembly that a citizen was willing to sell a certain piece of land at a certain priee, a citizen told the assembly that he or she was willing to rent these properties permanent1y, and the trlbe decided to buy and leas.e out the property.13 The decree concluded with the instruction to inscribe the XPlll!lX'ttcrl!Oç on the walls of the respective sanctuary.14 At Mylasa and in the surrounding villages special sub-divisions of the demos, not only the tribes but also so-called syngeneiai, administered the community and were responsible for the land-Ieases. Apart from this, the administrative procedures are comparable to those of other poleis. 15 My examination of the inscriptions focuses on the overall purpose of the leases and the role of the gods in the transactions. It draws on existing studies of the Carian leases and on characteristies of leasing in the Greek world in general. 16 Behrend carefully examined the legal aspects of purchase and subsequent lease. He points out that the formula I!tcrEloûv Eiç nlX'tptKa, whieh was in use already in the third century B.C., has its equivalents in the expressions eiç <id, Eiç 'tov anlXv'tlX Xpovov, KlX'tà~{ou used elsewhere in the 12 ID 503. Greek worldj leases from Ptolemaic Egypt show exactly the same phraseP Such a lease entailed that the supreme right of possession remained with the lessor (in other cases with the king), although the lessee received rights equivalent to those of an owner. This makes the leases at Mylasa a combination of the usual land leasing mechanisms and the royal practice of giving out land eiç 1ta'tptKa. The sanctuary gave up the right of managing the property but enjoyed a regular rent and created a strong bond between the god and the lessee. The lessee's strong position derived from the fact that the lease was hereditary and could even be transferred to a third person, a process which was called 1tapaxroP'Ilcnç. Although the cases resemble one another, each lease shows special features. .
Why such a Large Number of Leases?
Scholars find it difficult to explain the existence of the series as a whole: why was an apparently large proportion of the arable land of Mylasa in the possession of sanctuaries? Why did such an enormous number of transactions take place within a short period of time?I8 One might interpret the transactions simply as the most practical way of living for both sides: while the sanctuary preferred low-risk investments in landed property, the former owners, who continued to farm the land, paid only a modest rent and were able to spend capital on other investments. 19 This explanation, however, does not account for the sudden appearance of so many transactions; unless we assume a period of extraordinary prosperity of Carian sanctuaries.
In what follows, 1 want to refute current views briefly and then set out my own hypothesis. Chance of transmission or a change in the way' of recording leases cannot be the only reasons. 20 Undoubtedly, there was an exceptional interest of landowners in selling their lands to the gods, and these were exceptionally eager to invest in land. Ir has been suggested that the reason for this eagerness was the "fear of pirates". 
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property. Private landowners who sold their property would also need to protect considerable amounts of money.23 l therefore want to dismiss the reason "piracy" as the decisive factor. What about political reasons? The gods' landed property certainly formed an important part of the patterns of land-holding throughout Caria. Although one must not underestimate the social and political implications of changes in these patterns, l do not think that political motives triggered the sales. As the gods' ownership of widely scattered plots of land was a general feature, conclusions about the integration or political influence of the lessees of sacred land are problematic. 24 Were there economic advantages resulting from placing land under the aegis of a temple? As Mylasa had been à<popoÀ6Y11'toç from the peace of Apameia at the latest, tax exemptions would not have made religious centres exceptional landlords. 25 However, we might still suspect advantages to do with obligations levied by the city. The leases of sacred property show an exceptionally low rate of interest, that is ca. 4% of the purchase price;26 but the calculation and interpretation of such a rate of interest are problematic and often ill founded; we need evidence that enables us to compare the figures with rates of interest concerning land that is not qualified as sacred. l propose to draw on an inscription from Sinuri, which has not received much attention from scholars. 27 The basic situation described in the document has analogies at Mylasa itself,. at Telmessus, Athens and Delphi: 28 at Sinuri, the syngeneia appointed a certain Dionysius as one of the so-called hOtKOt, whose task was to operate against people trying to encroach upon the sacred domain of the god. 29 As soon as Dionysius and his colleagues had managed to restore the Ëyyaux for the god and the syngeneia, they turnèd to another matter. Certain people were accused of harming the syngeneia and the god by claiming a lower pharos -simply because they lived on sacred 23 Cf BOGAERT, op. cit. (n. 21), p. 270. 24 Reger, who is currently working on a new publication of this dossier, including new land-lease texts, believes that the land-leases are closely linked with the established sympoliteia of Mylasa and the smaller communities; he argues that as a consequence, the social position of the wealthy élite of the smaller towns was threatened and that the new land-holding patterns resulted in a patchwork of properties which advanced the integration of the smaller states; 1 have my doubts about this explanation, but it is inappropriate to elaborate these doubts in advance of the full publication of Professor Reger. land.
3o Unfortunately, the inscription remains enigmatic but the expectation of a low interest rate explains why people were generally interested in leasing land from the godsY 1 accept this as the reason why private land-owners would consider selling their property to gods.
However, why was it so cheap to rent from the gods? Were the sanctuaries welfare institutions? There is no indication that the citizens of Mylasa and its neighbouring small communities went through a phase of economic hardship so that they turned to the local sanctuaries for help, that is to free them from debt and mortgage. As far as 1 can see, none of the estates carried a mortgage. Nevertheless, 1 would argue that economic reasons were indeed responsible for the programmatic land-transfers -but we have to emphasise the economic needs of the other side involved, the sanctuaries. Recently, Merkelbach suggested that the transformation of so many private estates into temple land reflected a fundamentalist religious attitude and intended to revive the old Carian "Tempelwirtschaft" of premonetary times. Accordingly, a combination of "piety" and "atavism" was responsible for the programmatic changes in the pattern of land-holding, which were reversed as Caria became part of the Roman province of Asia. 32 Although neither of the two abstract concepts provide a satisfactory explanation, Merkelbach's focus on the sanctuaries leads us in the right direction. Moreover, he correctly points to the fact that the leases reflect programmatic activities, that private landowners must have been actively and publicly encouraged to sell their land.
An Allmentary Scheme for Sanctuaries 1 suggest that the Mylasean land-transfers are comparable to the Trajanic alimentary scheme. 33 This system of government aid, which provided for the support of children in towns aIl over Italy, was financed by government 30 Cf ibid.,!. 9-14; surprisingly, the offenders were treated with polite discretion. They were not named in the inscription but referred to vaguely as nvÉç. It is not necessarily a "positive" event or setting which couId lead to sudden financial operations of temples. 31 How should we imagine the situation? How can Dionysius act on behalf of the god and of the syngeneia? If there were no distinction between sacred and public funds, why is there a different rent? Cf ROBERT grants placed with landowners in the districts; each landowner who accepted a loan received a sum worth a certain percentage of the stated value of his land, on which he had to pay the city interest, which formed the income from which the children were supported. Rich information about the loans has come down to us through inscriptions from the towns of Ve1eia and Ligures Baebiani. 34 They illustrate that the farming out of loans to private landowners was the only and most effective means for securing a permanent revenue of a sufficient scale. 35 Being a perpetuaI foundation, they were selfcontained and protected the dependants from suspension of payment in years of deficit. In the light of this clear advantage -and in order to attract landowners to participate -the interest-rate on the loans could be and was a little lower than the rate mentioned as the normal return on landed investments. However, it was not the chief purpose of the scheme to provide landowners with cheap credit. On the contrary, it would appear that participation fell under the category of civic munera. 36 Like the Roman alimentary loans at the beginning of the second century A.D., the Mylasean land-transfers constituted a scheme designed to guarantee regular, reliable income for earmarked purposes. In this case, the Mylasean civic and religious authorities tried to solve a long-term, structural problem that many communities and their sanctuaries faced: very often the high costs of running the cults were not met by the existing regular sacred revenues. Sacred funds were easily diverted and treasuries highly unstable or spent on exceptional expenses. Sacred property had probably been gradually diminished because private landowners encroached on the estates of the gods. A good way to solve the problem and at the same time to free the community from an extra burden was to increase the land leased out for the gods.
Let us return to the texts. A few documents tell us about the purpose of the operations from the "gods' point of view". The investment is made so that "the gods will enjoy the revenues from sums bequeathed to them for all times".37 When in 240 B.e. the governor of Seleucus II, Olympichus, announced a dedication of lands to Zeus Osogoa, he referred to precisely the same purpose. 38 He suggested that the people of Mylasa lease out the dedi- Sanctuaries were well-advised not only to draw revenues from existing landed property, but also to acquire new estates as the best way of investing sacred funds. The following statements can be found in the documents: "As land is for sale, it is the appropriate thing to buy those properties for the gods": cruf. . t<pÉpov 8É ecr'ttv npto;cr8ar 'AnoÀ.À.covt Ko;t 'AptÉj.u8t 8wîç tO\) 8~j.lou 'üÀ.Uj.lÉcov àno tO\) àpyuptou tO\) oVtoç iEPO\) trov npoyeYPo;j.lj.lÉvcov 8EroV. 41 Sorne inscriptions allude to a temporary liquidity of the temple: enEt8~ev tep no;pov'tt unaPXEt trot 8~j.lcot 'üÀ.Uj.lÉcov iepov àpyupwv 'AnoÀ.À.covoç Ko;t 'AptÉj.lt8oç;42 a legacy or exceptional euergetism might have been responsible for the "sudden wealth": enEt8~nicrtoç EipllVo;toU ... Ko;tÉÀ.tnEV trot 'AnoÀ.À.covt Ko;t 'AptÉj.lt8t. .. àpyuptoU 8po;Xj.làç. 43 However, we also note a deliberate attempt to purchase property on behalf of a temple, although the full sum is not immediately available. In one case, three priests, men of high rank, advance the money and sign as responsible for the purchase. 44 At Sinuri, the commissioners report that they couId not find an appropriate territory for the amount they received for a purchase. 45 The leases were therefore not only a sensible investment of unused sacred funds but a necessary means to guarantee regular sacred revenues. Given this purpose, the enigmatic inscription from Sinuri becomes clearer:it illustrates the effort to make the sanctuary's status as landlord as permanent as possible. The lessee may change, as long as the regular revenues are guaranteed for the shrine. 46 That the focus of the programme layon the sanctuaries and that the landowners were not desperate to sell can be seen in the case of the loçal aristocrat Diodotus, son of Demetrius, who held a farm in joint ownership with Cleito, the daughter of Hybreas and priestess of Apollo and Artemis; while Demetrius sold his haIf to Zeus of the Otorkondeis, the priestess retained hers. 47 It is unlikely that half of the property was an economic burden while the other flourished. It is also understandable why only Demetrius' haIf was involved in the sale. The priestess would not sell her property to another deity, nor wauld there be any need for her ta take part in the scheme; her haIf might anyway have yielded incarne for the gods. Neither a "fundamentalist religious attitude", nor a revived "Tempelwirtschaft" are the right labels for the Mylasean land-Iease documents, They derived rather from the experience that the gods needed a guaranteed income and that only the revenues of sacred land could provide this.
